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Thomas Reid: Power as First Philosophy 
 
Thomas Reid (1710-1796), replacement for Adam Smith’s professorial chair in Moral 
Philosophy at Glasgow University and founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense, 
argued that animate beings have the capacity for power and that their actions are free 
within the constraints of that power. Power, for Reid, is the resource of the will. Power 
and weakness are contradictory as ‘weakness or impotence are defects or privations of 
power’1. This same logic can be applied to ability and disability. Disability is frequently 
conceived as the opposite to ability: the ‘able bodied’ being grouped differently to the 
‘disabled’. If disability were instead conceived as contradictory to ability, the power of 
the individual agent would be conceived of separately to their subjection to certain 
physical or mental disabilities. Power is what differentiates beings with a ‘will’ from 
those without; their power is, in a sense, what makes them the author of their actions 
and their life. This essay will argue that to be defined by ones limitations rather than by 
ones actions is consistent with the philosophies of scepticism and empiricism. It is only 
when, as in Reid’s philosophy, power in general as well as specific powers are separated 
out from the will and its experiential intertwinement that it becomes possible to 
conceive of disabilities as having nothing to do with power or the will; the will being 
subject to many different powers. The will can act in response to disability but it is not 
subject to their ‘power’ as they have none, which is to say that the agent has power over 
their dis/ability rather than their dis/ability having power over them.  
This essay will aim to explore what exactly Reid’s definition of power is; the 
significance of the difference of this notion of power in relation to those given by Locke 
and Hume; and, finally, offer suggestions for how this conception of power effects on a 
thinking of capability and disability.  
 
                                                          
1 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 11-
12. 
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I. What is Power? 
Although Reid does discuss specific powers these are not the particular subject of 
interest for this essay, instead it is his more general and primary notion of power which 
will be elaborated on. The definition he gives in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man 
is helpful because of the complexity he gives to the subject: 
The words power and faculty, which are often used in speaking of the mind, need 
little explication. Every operation supposes a power in the being that operates; 
for to suppose any thing to operate which has no power to operate is manifestly 
absurd. But, on the other hand, there is no absurdity in supposing a being to have 
power to operate when it does not operate. Thus, I may have power to walk 
when I sit, or to speak when I am silent. Every operation, therefore, implies 
power; but the power does not imply the operation.2 
Thus power is the prerequisite of every active or passive faculty and their operation. 
The implication of power in the operation but not the reverse highlights an inactive 
(although not passive) power can be called upon by operation but exists regardless of 
its being called upon. As long as a will is possible then it must be predicated by the 
existence of power, regardless of various limitations imposed on an individual by 
internal, external or corporeal states. This is significant in that ‘power’, as Reid 
conceives it, is outside the empirical realm at every instance when it is not an active in 
causing an empirically perceivable effect. Empiricism is not sufficient to the task of 
conceiving of power in Reid’s terms. It is embodied power rather than embodied 
perception that is afforded primacy in Reid’s philosophy That, for him, power exists 
even when it is not active or perceivable, puts him firmly against the empirical or 
sceptical schools of philosophy prevalent in the mid-eighteenth century. Instead it 
                                                          
2 Reid, T., Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1785), p. 6. 
Reid’s texts, particularly Essays on the Active Powers of Man, will be quoted from 
extensively as his texts are rarely read now, and not in common consciousness as 
Locke’s and Hume’s are. 
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might place him more in the context of philosophers such as Rousseau, Nietzsche and 
Dewey, for whom the body and its capacity for liberty as power prior to action, is of 
primary importance. 
The more general conception of power, which is not related to specific faculties 
but underlies them all, is introduced in his late and only recently published essay, ‘Of 
Power’, where it is defined as being antecedent not only to an event but also to the will 
which produces an event: 
Every voluntary exertion to produce an event seems to imply a persuasion in the 
agent that he has power to produce an event. A deliberate exertion to produce an 
event implies a conception of the event, and some belief or hope that his exertion 
will be followed by it. This I think cannot be denied. The consequence is that a 
conception of power is antecedent to every deliberate exertion of will to produce 
an event.3 
Several faculties might be called upon to conceive of an event before acting towards its 
realisation, however, each of these faculties and, of course, the will required to produce 
it through action are all dependent on sufficient power to do so. What interests Reid, 
perhaps particularly because of his emphasis on common sense, is that the conception of 
power precedes action, this is a conception of a general capacity as well as specific 
capability afforded by individual faculties.  Power precedes the operation of every 
individual faculty and every wilful action undertaken by an agent. Our conception of our 
own power, generally or specifically, is dependent on our faculties and therefore, for a 
gamut of reasons, we may vastly under or overestimate our power. We may be 
particularly prone to underestimate our power, for example, if we have learned read 
certain aspects of our constitution as directive or limiting of our action. Disability, 
gender, class and sexuality may be examples of perceivable qualities being operative in 
defining our ability to act, whereas, in Reid’s terms, these would be considered subject 
                                                          
3 Thomas Reid & John Haldane, (2001). An essay by Thomas Reid on the conception of 
power. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):1-12., p. 3. 
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to the agent’s power and therefore nothing to do with the faculties capable of utilising 
power. Reid’s location of the primacy of power in experience and action is the key to 
considering the agency available to us in its direction: 
We are conscious that we have power to produce certain events by our will and 
exertion. The conviction of this power is implied in the very voluntariness of 
exertion, for no man makes an exertion to do what he does not think to be in his 
power. In our own voluntary actions, therefore, we have a conviction and 
consequently a conception of efficient or productive power in ourselves. And this 
conception we had so early that it must be the work of nature.4 
Power is therefore not something that we invent or gain from outside but rather the 
basis of all understanding and action as well as the very capacity for future 
understanding or action. ‘Efficient or productive power’ is a predicate of a will and the 
action of the will is the only perceivable measure of that power even though will and 
power are not assimilable. Reid goes further, writing in Active Powers that not only does 
the will depend on power but that, in fact, the will is in man’s power: 
in common life, when men speak of what is, or is not, in a man's power, they 
attend only to the external and visible effects, which only can be perceived, and 
which only can affect them. Of these, it is true, that nothing is in a man's power, 
but what depends upon his will, and this is all that is meant by this common 
saying. But this is so far from excluding his will from being in his power, that it 
necessarily implies it. For to say that what depends upon the will is in a man's 
power, but the will is not in his power, is to say that the end is in his power, but 
the means necessary to that end are not in his power, which is a contradiction5.  
This significantly limits any conception of the primacy of the will in human action, 
making it subject not only to power in general but also to the complex relation between 
                                                          
4 Thomas Reid & John Haldane, (2001). An essay by Thomas Reid on the conception of 
power. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):1-12., p. 7. 
5 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 274. 
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the various faculties afforded power prior to its event. For example, I may want to lift a 
100kg weight in a complex compound exercise such as a power clean but I will not have 
sufficient power to do so if I am not yet strong enough to lift this weight; my central 
nervous system is insufficiently prepared; my nutrition has been poor the preceding 
week; or my mind is distracted by things outside of the gym or by occurrences in the 
gym. I may then reflect on my insufficient power and direct my will elsewhere 
accordingly. Power dictates the direction of the will and locates the will as being subject 
to various bodily faculties: emphasising the experience of the body and mind before the 
direction of the will. This conception of ‘power’ as being separate from the will and its 
effects is at once inside and outside the consideration of metaphysics, especially that of 
empiricism. Our very ability to have the power to conceive of power implies its 
existence. Reid’s conception of power is subject to this paradox because it in only 
implied in the ‘voluntariness of exertion’, it does not consist in it. Power is but is only 
measurable by its effects rather than in itself. 
By attempting to reduce ‘power’ to the logic of empiricism or metaphysics more 
generally and read it as just yet another ‘will’ we enter the territory of infinite regress 
which is therefore not applicable to Reid’s philosophy. As Timothy O’Connor argues, 
power precedes volition but is not itself volition because, ‘We needn't have performed a 
prior act of will in order to have determined the action‐initiating volition. We simply 
exert active power (a conception of which we form through its effects) in so 
determining it—that is, we determine the will directly. The exertion of active power is 
not itself a type of volition.’6 As such, active power is not will but it is what makes will 
possible. O’Connor goes on to suggest correctly that ‘an exertion of active power, 
according to Reid, is not any kind of event at all. Rather, it is the instantiation of a causal 
                                                          
6 Timothy O’ Connor, Person and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 46. 
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relation between agent and volition, and Reid does not consider this to be an event.’7 
Reid himself argues that: 
But it is said, "That nothing is in our power but what depends upon the will, and 
therefore the will itself cannot be in our power." I answer, That this is a fallacy 
arising from taking a common saying in a sense which it never was intended to 
convey, and in a sense contrary to what it necessarily implies.8 
This is why I argue that Gideon Yaffe is incorrect to state that Reid has ‘a well-developed 
conception of the metaphysics of power’ despite the fact that he suggests Reid ‘is able to 
tolerate the mysterious metaphysics that our linguistic practices imply and which bar us 
from analyzing the efficient causal relation in any way which could count as a 
reduction.’9 It is not the ‘metaphysics of power’ that Reid seems to be describing at all 
but rather the experience or sense of power. Of course at least one aspect of that 
experience is related to the faculty of reason but power is not limited to that faculty, nor 
is it subject to it. The danger for Reid is not just the reduction of the causal relation but, 
rather more importantly, the insistence of the reduction of power to metaphysics or 
specifically to the faculty of reason. We are able to relate the faculty of reason to power 
but power also enables that faculty, as well as many others, and is not the same as it.  
 
                                                          
7  Timothy O’ Connor, Person and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 47 
8 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 273. 
9 Gideon Yaffe, Manifest Activity: Thomas Reid's Theory of Action (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 157. As O’Connor argues, ‘Reid's view is not subject to 
any internal problem that forces him to choose between an infinite regress of mental 
acts and an uncaused event at the core of every free action. Reid never squarely 
addresses the further question of why the obtaining of a causal relation between agent 
and volition (an exertion of active power) doesn't qualify as a kind of event. It is not, to 
be sure, a prior event that produces the willing.’ in Timothy O’ Connor, Person and 
Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 48 
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II. Reid on Locke and Hume’s concepts of Power 
Reid reads Locke as suggesting that power is a form of potentiality which is preceded by 
a reflection influenced by sensory experience of the effects of power. This not only 
excludes power’s primacy but also reduces the sphere of human action to that of 
perception. Furthermore, it precludes the possibility of the conception of complex 
subjectivity as underpinning our understanding as well as our action. As such, Reid 
works towards unpacking Locke’s conception of a limited subjectivity and agency by 
beginning with an exposition and analysis of the philosopher’s conception of power: 
The sum of it is, That observing, by our senses, various changes in objects, we 
collect a possibility in one object to be changed, and in another a possibility of 
making that change, and so come by that idea which we call power. Thus we say 
the fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has power to be melted; the first he 
calls active, the second passive power. He thinks, however, that we have the most 
distinct notion of active power, by attending to the power which we ourselves 
exert, in giving motion to our bodies when at rest, or in directing our thoughts to 
this or the other object as we will. And this way of forming the idea of power he 
attributes to reflection, as he refers the former to sensations.10 
In Reid’s reading, everything for Locke is reduced to sensation and reflection, with no 
sense that both are subject to faculties which are themselves subject to sufficient power. 
The conflation of power to will or even basic physical action also leaves no room for a 
freedom prior to the application of the will. For Locke there is no power to reflect, only 
power in the actions that reflection results in. Most unsettlingly for Reid, power seems 
for Locke to be the potential to be effected on, as well as to effect, present in any object: 
Whereas he distinguishes power into active and passive, I conceive passive 
power is no power at all. He means by it, the possibility of being changed. To call 
this power, seems to be a misapplication of the word. I do not remember to have 
                                                          
10 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 23. 
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met with the phrase passive power in any other good author. Mr Locke seems to 
have been unlucky in inventing it; and it deserves not to be retained in our 
language.11 
Reid cannot come to terms with Locke’s use of the term ‘passive power’ because the 
idea that power is simply potentiality significantly reduces identity to perceivable traits 
or qualities and thereby to the logic of an empirical consciousness. For Locke, 
consciousness (as reflection on sensation) becomes an objective subjectivity with 
determinable potential. More importantly, the complexities of individual agency become 
secondary to empirically perceived reality. To understand fully the repercussions of this 
requires an inversion: if one’s subjective agency is primarily advanced through its 
relation to empirically determined reality then one is understood to be more or less 
able to perceive or engage in that ‘reality’. If, instead, primacy is afforded to power 
rather than variable sense perception then everything that follows in a conception of 
subjective agency would focus on the empowerment of variable ability rather than the 
limitations of disability. Equally, the primacy of power escapes from the reduction of 
‘reality’ to reason, as power cannot itself be reduced to reason, nor can the faculties 
which it empowers, including that of the faculty of reason. For Reid, the primacy of 
power frees agency from the constraints of determinable potential altogether. Potential 
is empirically determinable, power is not.  Every faculty is grounded in power and thus 
every idea is the product of the faculties that power engenders.  
Locke’s reduction of the derivation of ideas to what is empirically perceived is 
challenged by Reid as revealing the contradiction implicit in Locke’s philosophical 
thinking on how power is perceived: 
the account which Mr Locke himself gives of the origin of our idea of power, 
cannot be reconciled to his favourite doctrine, That all our simple ideas have 
their origin from sensation or reflection; and that, in attempting to derive the 
                                                          
11 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 23. 
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idea of power from these two sources only, he unawares brings in our memory, 
and our reasoning power, for a share in its origin.12 
It is with the scattered origin of power in the very faculties used to derive it that Reid 
enables the agent’s reflection on their own power beyond the confines of empirical and 
metaphysical thought. 
Reid continues his reading of Locke through his reading of Hume, who he rejects 
even more vehemently. Reid begins by outlining the latter’s arguments that ‘we have no 
idea of substance, material or spiritual; that body and mind are only certain trains of 
related impressions and ideas; that we have no idea of space or duration, and no idea of 
power, active or intellective.’13After making it clear that he only wishes to engage with 
what he disagrees with in Hume’s rejection of the popularly conceived conception of 
power, he writes: 
I observe, that whether this popular opinion be true or false, it follows from 
mens having this opinion, that they have an idea of power. A false opinion about 
power, no less than a true, implies an idea of power; for how can men have any 
opinion, true or false, about a thing of which they have no idea?14 
This very basic argument acts as a strategically placed platform from which Reid is able 
to further and more carefully critique Hume’s (non)conception of power through the 
latter’s reading of Locke: 
‘The first of the very obvious principles which the author opposes to Mr Locke's 
account of the idea of power, is, That reason alone can never give rise to any 
original idea. This appears to me so far from being a very obvious principle, that 
the contrary is very obvious. Is it not our reasoning faculty that gives rise to the 
idea of reasoning itself? As our idea of sight takes its rise from our being 
                                                          
12 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 26. 
13 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 27. 
14 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 30. 
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endowed with that faculty; so does our idea of reasoning. Do not the ideas of 
demonstration, of probability, our ideas of a syllogism, of major, minor and 
conclusion, of an enthymeme, dilemma, sorites, and all the various modes of 
reasoning, take their rise from the faculty of reason? Or is it possible, that a 
being, not endowed with the faculty of reasoning, should have these ideas? This 
principle, therefore, is so far from being obviously true, that it appears to be 
obviously false.15 
The analogical significance Reid gives to faculties of perception as well as the faculty of 
reason is not simply an analogy and, in fact, clarifies the grounding of both forms of 
faculty in power. Reid conceives of faculties as being generative of specific ideas and 
systems of though through the general power afforded by them to specific ends. This 
argument works in (at least) two directions at once; first, power is conceived of as being 
that which enables the operation of faculties; second, that the idea of power is 
generated or realised through the operation of these faculties, perhaps primarily (for 
Reid, at least) through their very operation.  
After Reid’s refutations of Hume’s suggestion that reason cannot give rise to 
original ideas, the latter’s form of scepticism as whole comes specifically under attack. 
Here it is Reid’s humility with regard to philosophical truth that allows him a position to 
attack Hume from. Philosophy for Reid seems perfectly valuable even if it is only able to 
afford provisional truths which may later be refuted or come into question: 
if we had experience, ever so constant, that every change in nature we have 
observed, actually had a cause, this might afford ground to believe, that, for the 
future, it shall be so but no ground at all to believe that it must be so, and cannot 
be otherwise. Another reason to shew that this principle is not learned from 
experience is, That experience does not shew us a cause of one in a hundred of 
those changes which we observe, and therefore can never teach us that there 
must be a cause of all. Of all the paradoxes this author has advanced, there is not 
                                                          
15 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 30. 
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one more shocking to the human understanding than this, That things may begin 
to exist without a cause. This would put an end to all speculation, as well as to all 
the business of life.16 
Not only does Reid here outline what he perceives as the un-philosophical character of 
scepticism through the limits it imposes on provisional philosophical thought and 
speculation but also its irrelevance to his own philosophical programme. As such, Reid 
moves away from Locke by suggesting a far more complex subjectivity which precedes 
specific actions or events whereas Hume is helpful to Reid in allowing him to 
demonstrate that the power of faculties is separate to their action, even if this is not 
conceivable within the confines of sceptical philosophy, which Reid rejects. 
 
III. Power, Liberty and Dis/ability 
Reid’s discussion of power is explicitly directed towards an elaboration of what he calls 
‘the liberty of moral agents’. He defines that latter in the following way: 
By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand, a power over the determinations of 
his own will. If, in any action, he had power to will what he did, or not to will it, in 
that action he is free. But if, in every voluntary action, the determination of his 
will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his 
mind, or of something in his external circumstances, he is not free; he has not 
what I call the liberty of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity.17 
Will, as already discussed, is not only dependent on sufficient power but also different 
from it. Power is outside of necessity and therefore is the only vestige of freedom and 
capacity for moral liberty. Moral actions cannot be measured in terms of involuntary 
states or circumstances, such as physical or mental disabilities, but must rather be 
understood in terms of the power available to the individual outside of necessity. The 
                                                          
16 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 32. 
17 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 267. 
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difficulty therein is that power is only perceivable through its effects on actions and 
events. However, it is to undermine the power of any agent to focus more on their 
subjection to necessity than on their wilful actions. Despite Reid’s primary focus being 
on power he is also sensitive to actions or ways of being which seem to involve no 
specific power as well as the influence of necessities such as illness. Equally there is 
little credit to be afforded to the action of an individual’s moral liberty if, as he argues in 
the case of Cato, their goodness is simply part of their constitution: 
What was, by an ancient author, said of Cato…He was good because he could not 
be otherwise. But this saying, if understood literally and strictly, is not the praise 
of Cato, but of his constitution, which was no more the work of Cato, than his 
existence. On the other hand, if a man be necessarily determined to do ill, this 
case seems to me to move pity, but not disapprobation. He was ill, because he 
could not be otherwise. Who can blame him? Necessity has no law.18 
Reid’s insistence on the absolute difference between necessity and power is significant 
in separating influences on agency from limits on agency.  It is therefore clearly possible 
to have a positive or enabling influence on an individual’s conception of their power, 
just as it is possible to engage (consciously or not) in disabling an individual’s agency 
through an education or culture where the perception of ‘weaknesses’ is  given primacy. 
The role cultures and societies play in enabling rather than labelling otherwise ‘free 
agents’ becomes a very particular kind of moral question when then individual moral 
action of an individual is suppressed or they are not educated in such a way as to be 
aware of their own power and its concomitant liberty. 
Reid’s conception of a ‘free agent’ is extremely nuanced and puts into question 
the concept of a ‘reasonable agent’, the faculty of reason being only one of many 
influencing the actions of man: 
                                                          
18 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 269. 
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We call man a free agent in the same way as we call him a reasonable agent. In 
many things he is not guided by reason, but by principles similar to those of the 
brutes. His reason is weak at best. It is liable to be impaired or lost, by his own 
fault, or by other means. In like manner, he may be a free agent, though his 
freedom of action may have many similar limitations. The liberty I have 
described has been represented by some Philosophers as inconceivable, and as 
involving an absurdity.19 
Liberty, for Reid, is not freedom of the will (reasonable or not) but rather the freedom 
afforded to the individual by their power, which may or may not become realised in the 
will. It is the freedom of power to be able to act by instinct or habit as well through 
conscious will. It is only within this freedom of power that his conception of moral 
liberty can be of significance, precisely because the freedom is much greater and more 
complex than simply the freedom of the will (to be well or ill according to an external or 
internal rational schema).  The presumed absurdity he locates is that of infinite regress 
of will, however, as Reid conceives of it, this regression ends in power. The specific 
effects of power on moral liberty are defined as being limited and frequently completely 
absent – most actions perhaps being conceivable as amoral: 
This moral liberty a man may have, though it do not extend to all his actions, or 
even to all his voluntary actions. He does many things by instinct, many things by 
the force of habit without any thought at all, and consequently without will. In 
the first part of life, he has not the power of self-government any more than the 
brutes. That power over the determinations of his own will, which belongs to 
him in ripe years, is limited, as all his powers are; and it is perhaps beyond the 
reach of his understanding to define its limits with precision. We can only say, in 
general, that it extends to every action for which he is accountable.20 
                                                          
19 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 271. 
20 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh: John Bell, 1788), p. 270. 
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As such power seems to develop with age and are presumably educable. It is perhaps 
also possible to create a context where the enabling of individual powers is of primary 
educative value, rather than one where power is read as secondary to perceivable 
objective potential. Power over the determination of will is achieved through the 
complex relations of the specific powers of the various faculties. But as long as there is 
power there is freedom and it is in that freedom, rather than in our limitations, that we 
may begin to act. 
